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DRAFT

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I. General

1. In general, we believe that very few governments would prove receptive to US proposals that they extend facilities or rights for Oxcart flights -- particularly since they would know, or in any case suspect, that such flights would be targetted against the USSR. In the case of certain close US allies, those in the governments who are most concerned with intelligence and military strategy would no doubt press their political superiors to cooperate in the program; some of the latter might sympathize with the objectives of the effort and hope for the success of the program. However, except as noted below, we believe that the political chiefs would prefer that their countries not be involved and, in effect, would hope that the US would either decide not to conduct the program, or would make arrangements for carrying it out which did not include them.

2. Some friendly governments would strongly question the need or desirability of these flights on principle -- having in mind the heightened East-West tensions resulting from the U-2 crisis of 1961, the subsequent public undertakings by President

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Eisenhower and President Kennedy that overflights of the USSR would not be permitted, and the commonly known fact that the US is using satellite reconnaissance -- which would seem to them to do the job with few of the risks. In addition, there is a widespread belief -- much more evident and pervasive than in the '50s or early '60s -- that the danger of the Soviets initiating war is small; in the minds of many governments, including those in NATO, this belief not only argues against the urgency of improving intelligence coverage on the USSR, but also fortifies their inclination not to risk provoking greater East-West tensions.

3. Some friendly governments would feel more strongly on these matters than would others, and there are of course important differences between them in terms of their own freedom of action (e.g., with respect to constitutional requirements, the importance and orientation of public opinion, numbers of people to be consulted, and the like). But in almost all cases, we believe that the responsible political authorities would be unlikely to consent to staging and recovery rights. The exceptions would probably involve significant quid pro quos from the US, and these possibilities are discussed below. There is somewhat

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